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Abstract
The U.K Anti-Bribery Act ("the Act") makes both bribery of a public official and private-to-
private commercial bribery illegal, and imposes a strict liability offense on commercial organiza-
tions that fail to prevent bribery by persons associated with them. The Act has extraterritorial
effect and applies to transactions of British subjects or on British territory. "Commercial organiza-
tions" may raise the statutory defense of having "adequate procedures" in place to prevent bribery,
which, if proven, exonerates the commercial organization from strict liability for bribery by their
"associated persons." Unlike the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.K Act does not
exempt facilitation payments ("grease') from coverage. The Act meets and exceeds Britain's obli-
gations under the Organization ofEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery
Convention, itself too an outgrowth of the U.S. FCPA, seeks to raise international standards, and
relies on "soft law" to do so in tandem with "hard law."
The British Act is often criticized for overreach and ambiguity. This article analyzes the genesis
of the British Act, arguing that several of the criticisms of the British Act are valid hut that the Act
can be cured of many of its perceived flaws by reference to common law concepts (e.g., agency) or by
reference to flanking international instruments as persuasive evidence of the British legislator's
intent and/or the goals of the Act. The Act is notable in that it represents the success of hard law
crystallizing out of soft law. The Act is also notable in that it will inevitably generate more soft law
(codes of conduct, contract terms, managerial guidelines) as companies scramble to set up adequate
procedures. The development of best practices in business is an example of the use of private law
norms to generate binding law. It could be seen as evidence of Professor Ralph Steinhardt's Lex
Mercatoria hypothesis.
* Drjur. Eric Engle JD, DEA, LLM is a professor of law at Pericles-ABLE in Moscow, Russian
Federation. The author may be contacted via email at: eengle@pericles.ru.
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I. Introduction
Terrorist financing. Corrupted officials. Money laundering. The terms of trade in the
black market are at times underwritten in blood. Most instances of corruption are not
cases of blood money.' There is an entire underground economy which is bloodless: un-
documented workers; sex workers; penny-ante wagers; and at the riskier end, cigarette
smuggling and drug dealing. What about corruption? Official/unofficial corruption is an
invisible transaction cost to the expense of businesses; costs aside though, what's wrong
with "grease?"2
The problem with grease payments, even when oil and blood are not mixed, is that they
represent a lack of transparency.3 We could of course (re)characterize facilitation pay-
ments as a simple "user fee," a type of tax levied by impoverished states to finance their
essential services. It would be better for the rule of law for developing and transition
economies to legally transform the common practice of facilitation payments into overt
user fees, e.g., expedited service fees or administrative fines. Essentially, we should see a
large part of the battle of corruption as the transformation of illegal transactions into legal
ones. From the prosecutorial side, amnesties for giving up evidence and deferrals of pros-
ecution (DAPs) are two more tools. Amnesty is fairly straightforward for whatever reason
and to whatever extent certain persons or transactions are immunized from prosecution.
In a deferral of prosecution, a tool often permitted in the United States, the prosecutor
holds off on prosecuting the illegal activity so as to give the company the chance to get its
house in order. The logic of amnesties, DAPs, and plea bargaining is the preservation of
scarce prosecutorial resources and the non-disruption of commerce. It is a matter of
"winding down" the "dodgy deals" and restructuring them into above the board legality to
attain transparency and accountability.4
1. "While there is no doubt that petty corruption in the form of bribes to obtain services such as a pass-
port or a driving licence from government officials is prevalent in many developing countries and injurious to
trust in the government and the rule of law, it is corruption at the grand level in the form of bribes by
businesses to domestic and foreign public officials that is seen as causing the greatest harm to a country in
terms of economic growth and high levels of poverty." Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention Ten Years On, 5 MANCHEFSFER J. OF INT'L EcON. L. 3, 4 (2008), available at http://
epubs.surrey.ac.uk/578/1/fulltext.pdf.
2. Facilitation payments are payments made to government officials not to influence a sovereign decision
but to obtain execution of a right to which the payer is already entitled; they are also called "grease pay-
ments." See generally, Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, Current Development: The FCPA in Russia
and Other Former Communist Countries, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 378, 380 (1997).
3. "The House of Representative makes clear such activities 'cast a shadow on all US companies. The
exposure ... can damage a company's image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and
result in the appropriation of valuable assets overseas.'" Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 1, at 7.
4. "Although many commentators may find it unsurprising that some multinational firms vigorously pur-
sue corruptly influenced contracts-or are at least complacent in accepting such contracts--another view
holds that such an account is too cynical. These optimists claim that corruption is inefficient and argue that
moral signals from the countries that have prohibited corruption by statute can also motivate firms. Under
such a view, most multinational corporations should endeavor to comply with the law." David C. Weiss, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement Of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weigh-
ing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MicHi. J. IN'L. L. 471, 472-73 (2009).
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Corruption is a problem-a tranrnational problem.5 Corruption represents an increased
transaction cost, a distortion of economic signals, a lack of transparency, an obstruction to
free trade, and a source of inefficiencies such as nepotism and tax fraud. Thus, all states
benefit from the suppression of corruption. Consequently, there is an ever-greater ten-
dency to criminalize and prosecute bribery both internationally and domestically,6 as evi-
denced by the recent upswing in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prosecutions7 and
the passage of the British Anti-Bribery Act. There are numerous reasons speculated at to
explain the increased prosecutions,8 but the fact of increased prosecution of a growing
array of norms is there.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention
and the Council of Europe (COE) Convention seek to create a framework within which
national legislation can and is developed to end corruption. Accordingly, the Act seeks to
implement Britain's normative and legal obligations under anti-corruption treaties
promulgated by the OECD, the COE, and the E.U. The Act seeks not only to meet but
also to exceed existing international standards, thereby raising the level of legal trans-
parency and accountability internationally. 9 But the Act's own terms are vague, casting a
broad net, which reaches actors and actions that might be better regulated through private
law relations. This article proposes: (1) interpretations of the Act that would cure it of
vagueness by presenting concepts around which to define the ambiguities (e.g., fiduciary
duty, good faith and fair dealing) (2) to limit the Act's scope to the types of actions and
actors envisioned in existing international treaty law, while (3) enhancing the Act's effec-
tiveness by expanding remedies through equitable concepts such as forfeiture, procure-
ment bars, and licensing restrictions. This paper exposes and critiques the British law in
order to help make it more effective. To do so, it must first expose and compare the
foreign laws that inspired the U.K. legislation.
The rise of the norm against bribery under international law is an example of a soft law
approach that succeeded to form and, over time, implemented a particular norm. The
model of shaping and enforcing an international norm described here can be applied to
other international governance issues. The experience of the anti-bribery convention
could be applied to the fight against pollution, for example.
5. "The US recognised that bribery of foreign public officials was not simply a US problem but a universal
one. In aggressively promoting the adoption of similar legislation in other industrialised countries the US
sought to ensure a level playing field for competing businesses and to increase market integrity and stability.
The FCPA is legislation that has economic interests at its heart. It took until 1997 for the US pressure to
bear fruit and that came in the form of the OECD Convention." Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 1, at 7.
6. See Weiss, supra note 4, at 473.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 483.
9. "Going beyond, for example, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it has been said to set a new 'gold
standard' in anti bribery legislation." Andrew Ottley & Chris Jefferis, Bribery Act 2010: Briefing and Gui-
dance, INCE & Co., (Oct. 2010), http://www.incelaw.com/documents/pdf/Strands/Commercial-Disputes/
bribery-act-2010.pdf
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H. Legislation
A. THE FoREIGN CoRRUPT PRACTICEs ACT (FCPA)
"Genetically," i.e., historically, the most important legislation in the field of interna-
tional bribery was a U.S. law: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This law was enacted in
the wake of the Watergate political scandal and intended to affirm the United States'
commitment to the rule of law and international human rights. It was not however merely
a case of naive altruism or enlightened maintenance of U.S. hegemony: the U.S. leader-
ship saw, correctly, that murky overseas illegality represents a hidden transaction cost and
a source of inefficiencies,10 and that combating corruption would be of interest to key U.S.
allies. This, however, put the United States at a competitive disadvantage against other
countries that did not (then) outlaw the (overseas) transactions covered by the FCPA
(bribery," essentially). Because commerce is often international and works as a potential
competitive disadvantage to U.S. corporations, the FCPA was given what at that time was
a revolutionary international scope of application: bribery at home and abroad would be
sanctioned. However, it would take decades of lobbying for the U.S.-inspired vision to be
translated into international treaty law, and from there, into the laws of other states.12
Ultimately, the FCPA "became the model for similar international initiatives, most nota-
bly the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD') Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions,"1 3 which explains its interest here.
1. Bases of Liability under the FCPA
The FCPA prohibits bribery of public officials,'1 not commercial bribery, i.e. bribery of
private law persons. Today, the FCPA also requires companies with securities listed on
the U.S. stock market to comply with the accounting provisions of U.S. law.'s This
"books and records" provision of the FCPA16 is particularly useful' 7 and could be taken up
in other legislation (viz, the British Anti-Bribery Act). The books and records provisions
are more useful than the bribery provisions because they do not require a proof of scien-
10. "U.S. trade officials clearly recognized that bribery and corruption can block and distort international
economic transactions." Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and
Corruption, 4J. INr'L EcoN. L. 275, 286 (2001).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3 (2010).
12. The United States introduced FCPA, then pressured OECD and the U.N., with little success, for 10
years. Abbott, supra note 10, at 283.
13. Thomas F. McInerney, The Regulation of Bribery in the United States, 73 INT'L R. OF PENAL L. 81, 82
(2002), available at http://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-penal-2002-1-page-81.htm.
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3.
15. See § 78m.
16. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
17. "The accounting and internal controls provisions together constitute one of the most effective weapons
regulators possess in enforcing the FCPA. While these provisions are only enforceable by the SEC on a civil
basis, and apply only to companies with securities registered under the Exchange Act (rather than all persons'
as do the anti-bribery provisions), it is much easier for regulators to prove their case." McInerney, supra note
13, at 87-88.
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ter' 8-the standard of proof is lower. Further, by tracking financial statements, wrongful
acts are easier to trace and prove. 19 Since its initial enactment, the FCPA has been
amended 20 and strengthened and given greater extraterritorial application; at the same
time, defenses to FCPA liability also have been more clearly defined.
2. Eremptions from Liability under the FCPA
Because of the wide reach of the law, defenses and exceptions were soon carved out.21
Payments for "routine governmental action," in other words, the ministerial rather than
sovereign acts of the foreign official22 such as "facilitating or expediting payment to a
foreign official, political party or party official" intending to "secure the performance of a
routine governmental action," are exempt from the FCPA.23 This exception applies only
to "ministerial" duties and not to discretionary decisions, such as whether "to award new
business or to continue business with a particular party."24 These are called "facilitation"
payments or "grease" payments and merely expedite the execution of a right to which one
is already entitled. 25 Another exception was also found: payments, gifts, offers, or
promises that are lawful under the laws of the recipient's country,26 as well as sums paid in
good faith-for example, travel or lodging expenses in connection with the "promotion,
demonstration, or explanation" of products or services, or the "execution or performance"
of a contract with a foreign government would be exempted from the FCPA.27 That is,
the sanctioned act must be an instance of "dual criminality," something illegal both in the
United States and the country (or countries) where the transaction occurred.
3. Remedies under the FCPA
There are several remedies under the FCPA. The Department of Justice can seek a
permanent injunction of the wrongful activity, 28 companies can be fined, 29 and natural
persons may be fined and/or imprisoned. 30 May the bribe itself be recovered? Yes-to
the United States Treasury. "[IMt is unclear whether Congress intended that the SEC
pursue disgorgement in FCPA enforcement."3 1 Disgorgement of wrongful profits is an
18. "The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, unlike the books and records provisions, require scienter for
liability to attach. The definitions in the statute indicate that 'knowing' conduct exists if (i) a person is aware
that they are engaging in certain conduct, that such circumstances exist, or that the result is substantially
certain to occur, or (ii) the person has a 'firm belief' that such circumstance exists or is substantially certain to
occur." Id. at 84.
19. Id. at 87-88.
20. See The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (amending
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c).
22. § 78dd-l(b).
23. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(B).
25. See Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 2.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)( 1); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1).
27. McInerney, supra note 13, at 85.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(d).
29. § 78dd-2(g).
30. § 78dd-3(e).
31. Weiss, supra note 4, at 496.
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equitable remedy under the FCPA,32 available thanks to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 3 even in
cases of violation of the books and records provisions of the FCPA.34 Disgorgement of
wrongful profits and their forfeiture to the state or even private parties is an un-
problematic issue internationally. 35 But the potential for jurisdictional conflict indicates
why we must be cautious regarding disgorgement as an international remedy: aside from
the difficulty of estimating profits that arise directly from a bribe,36 there is the risk of
international conflicts over spoliation of the proceeds of corporate wrongdoing.
B. THE OECD CONVEION
Following the enactment of the FCPA, U.S. pressure led the OECD to draft an anti-
bribery convention.37 The OECD Convention "in large part tracked the normative as-
pects of the FCPA."38 Bribery of foreign public officials is prohibited under the OECD
Convention39 and bribes paid to foreign officials are subject to seizure and confiscation.40
Corporations may be liable under the Convention.41 The OECD Convention permits
extraterritorial jurisdiction 42 (extraterritorial application of national anti-bribery laws is
unproblematic internationally),43 provides for extradition,44 and mandates mutual legal
32. "The SEC can support its pursuit of disgorgement under broad equitable principles or statutory au-
thorization. Disgorgement is an equitable concept that has existed in Exchange Act jurisprudence for de-
cades. The first case using the word 'disgorgement' for violations of Rule lOb-5 stated: '[I]t is simple equity
that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment.' While disgorgement can serve deterrence
purposes, it is intended not to compensate the wronged party or to serve as a complete stand-in for the
deterrent effects of fining, but to recover the benefits of a wrongful act. Although a longstanding equitable
tool, disgorgement was used relatively sparingly by the SEC until the passage of SOX, which is also, now, a
part of the Exchange Act." Id. at 485.
33. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28
and 29 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
34. Weiss, supra note 4, at 474.
35. Id. at 492.
36. Id. at 499.
37. "The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to combat corruption of foreign public officials was
pressure applied by the United States ... which took almost two decades to bring about the intended result."
Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 1, at 6.
38. McInerney, supra note 13, at 89.
39. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
and Related Documents, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at http//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/
38028044.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery].
40. "Each implementing State must also 'take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe
and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of
such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are
applicable.'" Weiss, supra note 4, at 480.
41. Art. 2 artificial persons liability states: "Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public
official." Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. "Belgium, for example, prohibits foreign bribery under a universal jurisdiction statute that applies to
'any person' 'who is neither a Belgian national nor has their principle place of residence in Belgium.' Brazil-
ian authorities have asserted that an offense needs only to have 'touched' Brazilian territory for jurisdiction to
be valid." Weiss, supra note 4, at 493.
44. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 39.
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assistance. 45 Article 9(3) is particularly interesting, as it prohibits a state party from assert-
ing bank secrecy as grounds to refuse to cooperate in the enforcement of the treaty.46
These normative positions could, and I think should, be seen as of interpretive value in
construing the British Anti-Bribery Act.
The OECD anti-bribery convention took a "functional approach,"47 focusing on the
effects of the national legislation rather than the individual rules.48 That is, the OECD
Convention resembles an E.U. Directive, indicating to state parties what is to be prohib-
ited, but leaving the means to national law. In sum, slowly, yet inexorably, an interna-
tional norm against official bribery has formed. 49 Thus, several states have enacted anti-
bribery legislation pursuant to the OECD convention.50
C. THE WTO
The surprisingly successful "soft law" approach taken by the OECD5I can be contrasted
with the law/no law approach taken by the WTO. The WTO has not undertaken anti-
bribery legislation. 52 This is because soft law is regarded with suspicion and skepticism at
the WTO.s> The fear is that developing WTO soft norms would undermine the existing
WTO hard law54 because soft law norms could not be enforced,55 which would reduce
WTO legitimacy. Thus, to date, the OECD, and not the WTO, has been the principle
force for the formation of the norm against bribery.
45. Id.
46. "A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance for criminal matters within the scope of this
Convention on the ground of bank secrecy." Id.
47. Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 1, at 9.
48. "Practices and informal rules are part of this approach as well as other aspects of the legal system taking
over ancillary functions. Therefore the focus of comparison would lie on overall effects produced by a coun-
try's legal system rather than the individual rules." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
49. A recent study on enforcement of anti-corruption laws by OECD countries "showed slow but steady
movement toward more proactive government enforcement of anti-corruption laws over the first decade of
the OECD Convention. In the past couple of years, the Bush and now Obama Administrations have substan-
tially ratcheted up the US Government's pursuit of all manner of cases in the anti-corruption space." Andrea
Bonime-Blanc, The UK Anti-Bribery Act: How Global Companies Should Prepare, EnmcAL CoRP., Sept. 14,
2010, http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?contentid=7075.
50. For a list of national legislation implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, see OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/30/
0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1,00.hnI (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
51. "Discussions in the OECD and WTO were based on very different conceptions of the process of
legalization. In the OECD, the U.S. pursued a 'transformational' soft law strategy that over five years-1993
to 1997-produced a legally binding Convention. The U.S. undoubtedly adopted a gradualist strategy in this
case because an inmmnediate move to hard law seemed politically infeasible, but the approach was highly conge-
nial to the OECD, which acts through a variety of soft (recommendations) and hard (decisions, conventions)
legal instruments." Abbott, supra note 10, at 290.
52. Id. at 275-96.
53. "In the WTO, in contrast, negotiators from the U.S. and other developed country governments, at
least, perceived only two possible outcomes: a hard, legally binding multilateral agreement (whether on cor-
ruption, market access or TGP) or no action at all." Id. at 290.
54. "The focus on hard law was not simply a matter of tactics on this particular issue. It reflected a deep-
seated understanding of how the WTO operates and should operate. The conviction that the WTO is an
organization that deals only in hard law was most clearly revealed in debates over the applicability of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism to TGP." Id.
55. Id. at 291.
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D. THE COUNSEL OF EUROPE (COE) CONVE-nON
Following the FCPA model, the Council of Europe Convention obliges State Parties to
create offenses in their national law for fraudulent accounting practices.56 The COE
Convention permits State Parties to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over offenses on
the basis of nationality or territoriality.57 Article 17(3), for its part, imposes a duty to
extradite or prosecute, which is becoming ever more clearly a general principle of interna-
tional law: states must prosecute or extradite criminals subject to their jurisdiction-aut
dedere aut judicare.ss The COE convention permits criminal or civil liability for legal
persons in accordance with national law5 9 because, e.g., corporations under German civil
law, e.g., cannot commit crimes, but can be in (delictual) violation of administrative provi-
sions. Corporate liability shall not exclude the possibility of civil liability of natural culpa-
ble persons.60 Article 21 of the COE convention mandates cooperation between national
authorities.61
E. COMMON FEATURES OF THE LAws
Because the laws described all share a common lineage and logic, they share various
features. These are synoptically described below to illustrate the state practice of the
forming customary norm against bribery of public officials.
1. Corporate Criminal Liability-Permitted, Not Mandated
The conventions mandate that corporations be held liable in accord with national law.
The civil liability of corporations here is not at issue-that is unproblematic. What is less
clear, internationally, is whether and how a corporation may be held criminally liable, e.g.
as an accomplice or even principal. Germany and most States using Germanic civil law do
not recognize corporate criminal liability for the simple and logical reason that corpora-
tions, unlike natural persons, are incapable of moral culpability.62 Of course, corporations
in Germanic civilianist jurisdictions may be liable in tort and for administrative violations
(Ordnungswidrigkeiten). Accordingly, the international conventions mandate either civil or
criminal sanction, leaving the precise characterization of the sanction as civil, criminal, or
some mix to national law. Because the common law does recognize corporate criminal
liability,63 the extraterritorial application of common law legislation subjects foreign cor-
porations to criminal liability. Criminal liability of corporations is thus an international
56. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan 27, 1999, E.T.S. 173, available at http-//conven-
tions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/173.htm [hereinafter Criminal Law Convention].
57. Id. art. 17.
58. See e.g., R v. Bow St. Mero. Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [19991
1 A.C. (H.L.) 147, 154.
59. Criminal Law Convention, supra note 56, art. 18.
60. Id. art. 18(3).
61. Id. art. 21.
62. See generally Ginter Stratenwerth, Strarchtliche Unternehmensbaftung, IN Festschrift fiir Rudolf
Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag 295-310 (K. Geppert, J. Bohnert & R. Rengier eds., 1992).
63. Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., [19151 A.C. 705, 713 (H.L.) (Viscount Haldane;
'directing mind' principle; wrongful act of corporate director attributed to corporation).
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practice,64 and holding corporations criminally liable for violations of international law,
for example under the Alien Tort Statute, is consistent with customary public international
law.
2. Dual Criminality
In the context of extradition, "double criminality" (also known as "dual criminality") is
the principle that the criminal act which is the basis for the desired extradition must be a
crime both in the state asserting jurisdiction and in the state where the crime occurred. 65
States which apply a principle of "double criminality" refuse to extradite unless there is
"double criminality."66 Corporations cannot be extradited, so the issue of dual criminality
normally does not arise in the context of corporate crimes. This procedural fact obviates
the potential problem of determining whether the civil violations of corporations in juris-
dictions which refuse to impute criminal liability to corporations satisfy the dual criminal-
ity requirement for extradition. But, because corporations can be liable for bribery under
national or international law, and because some states permit extraterritorial application of
their anti-bribery statutes only where the principle of dual criminality is satisfied, the the-
oretical problem reappears. The solution in national law is to assimilate the civil law
violations of corporations under Germanic civilian law to the criminal liability of corpora-
tions in common law jurisdictions for the application of the test to determine whether the
act is wrongful in both (or all) relevant jurisdictions. 67
3. Cross Border Cooperation
The various national and international instruments have extraterritorial effect to rem-
edy international corruption. This leads to the issue of international cooperation, which
has been increasing in recent years.68 Today, informal agreements exist to avoid the
problems of double jeopardy and multiple prosecution69 as well as to ensure transfer of
(confidential) information and cooperation between national law enforcement.
64. "Given the many approaches to imputing fault on the part of a company it is unfortunate that the
OECD has not put forward an autonomous provision to address this issue." Carr & Outhwaite, supra note 1,
at 16.
65. "It is a fundamental requirement of international extradition that the crime for which extradition is
sought be one provided for by the treaty between the requesting and the requested nation. The second
determination is whether the conduct is illegal in both countries." Heilbronn v. Kendall, 775 F. Supp. 1020,
1023 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
66. "A broad interpretation of the requirement of dual criminality is followed: The law does not require
that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be the same, nor that the scope of the
liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular
act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions. The fact that a particular act is classified differently or that
different requirements of proof are applicable in the two countries does not defeat extradition." Id. at 1025.
67. One can readily imagine situations where the wrongful act occurred in several jurisdictions, or where
the national is subject to multiple states' jurisdiction. In the corporate context the struggle between the "real
seat theory" versus the "incorporation theory" to detennine the nationality of the corporation recurs here,
too. See, e.g., Kilian Baelz & Teresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztbeorie): the European Court
of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company Law, 3
GEImAN L. J. 12, available at http-J/www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=214.
68. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was a Line Item, N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 20, 2008,
http-//www.nytimes.comi/2008/12/ 2 1/business/worldbusiness/2 1siemens.html.
69. Weiss, supra note 4, at 504.
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4. Taxation-Non deductibility of Corruption Payments
One real point of progress made by the conventions is the rise of a norm that corrup-
tion payments will not be deductible from taxable income. Article 12.4, UNCAC provides
that "Each State Party shall disallow the tax deductibility of expenses that constitute
bribes."70 Similarly, the OECD recommends that tax deduction of corruption payments
be disallowed.7' It is also worth noting that tax fraud and bribery often go hand-in-
hand. 72 The Conventions make bribery non-deductible in order to root out tax fraud as
well as bribery.
Ell. The U.K Anti-Bribery Act ("the Act")7 3
Against this background, Britain recently enacted an extensive anti-bribery statute in
order to meet and exceed the OECD Convention's standards. The British legislation was
likely, in part, a response to the OECD's report calling on the United Kingdom to enact
effective anti-corruption legislation. 74 The British statute, in sum, 75 attempts to govern
not only bribery of public officials but also commercial bribery of private actors inter se
(as, for example, where a person bribes another person to breach their fiduciary duty to
their employer). The British statute sanctions not only the wrongful acts of physical, i.e.
natural persons but also those of corporations. 76 Furthermore, and perhaps problemati-
cally, the British law applies a strict liability regime to corporate liability.77 Like the
FCPA,'8 the British law applies extraterritorially. 79 Unlike the FCPA, the British statute
does not provide an express exemption for liability for facilitation payments. I do not
think one could be fairly implied from the terms of the statute, but some judges are crea-
tive sometimes.
The Act includes controversial, even questionable, bases for liability. If I read this stat-
ute correctly, it imposes extraterritorial strict liability for corporate commercial bribery.
70. United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 12.4, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinaf-
ter UNCAC).
71. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, at 2,
[C(96)27/FINALI (Apr. 11, 1996).
72. "In our experience, it is during interactions with foreign tax officials (both direct and indirect tax au-
thorities) that many bribes take place." David Lawler, The Bribery Bill-What Does it Mean For UKpk?, EURO-
PEAN UNION ANrn-BRIBERY BLOG, (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.antibriberyblog.eu/2009/12/the-bribery-bill-
a-non-technical-summary/.
73. Throughout this section quotation marks are used to indicate the exact terms of the Act, not as "scare
quotes."
74. See OECD Group Demands Rapid UK Action to Enact Adequate Anti-Bribery Laws, OECD, Oct. 16, 2008,
http-1/www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_3485 5_41515464_II__1.,00.html.
75. "[he Bribery Act makes it an offense to receive, as well as give, a bribe; bribery of private individuals
and companies is criminalized; there is no need to prove corrupt intent; there is a strict liability corporate
offense for failing to prevent bribery; there is no exemption for facilitation payments; and the extraterritorial
reach has a broader impact for companies and individuals." The UK Bribery Act 2010: What US Companies




78. Lawler, supra note 72.
79. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 43, § 12 (U.K.).
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This strict liability of the corporate body for the wrongful act of its "associated person"
can be avoided if the corporation had "adequate procedures" in place to prevent the
wrongful act. The "adequate procedures" defense had not arisen in any of the interna-
tional instruments or the FCPA so far as I have seen, but neither had strict liability. In
addition to controversial theories, which reach extraterritorially to corporate actors and
include strict liability, the Act also suffers from ambiguities. None of those weaknesses are
fatal, but they will require much judicial interpretation to be cured.
Despite the flaws-ambiguity and overreaching, the Act is a "hopeful monster." First,
the legislation represents another example of the success of functionalist method.80 Sec-
ond, the statute represents an example of the power of non-binding soft law as a "strange
attractor" for obligatory compliance.
A. SoFr LAw: A STRANGE ATTRACTOR FOR THE AcCRETION OF HARD LAw
International anti-bribery legislation is an example of effective transnational govern-
ance. How exactly did a binding international norm against the bribery of public officials
arise? The approach taken follows: First, normative goals with few or no enforcement
mechanisms, but which may be used to interpret other laws and/or as persuasive evidence
of binding law, are established at the global or regional level. Second, these normative
goals are then taken up and implemented via regional, national, and even private actors
(e.g. corporate codes of conduct). Both private law actors (corporations, NGOs) and pub-
lic law actors (states, international organizations) are used to establish the norm and to
attribute greater and greater binding force to it over time. In sum, the persuasive and
desired normative goal-here, transparent government, which is desired in fact by all hon-
est persons, is attained gradually by ratcheting standards upward over time.8'
The British Act attempts to further that process along by addressing commercial bribery
and also by giving a hard law role to soft law actions of non-state actors. The corporate
defense of adequate procedures is nothing other than an implied command to companies
to form soft law in this field, soft law which will influence not merely the interpretation of
hard law but also its application. To me, the Act represents the efficacy of soft law trans-
national governance and this model of international governance should be understood for
it may have applications in many other fields.
B. THE TERMS OF THE AcT
The statute first defines a "general bribery offence"82-bribing another person for im-
proper performance.83 The statute then 84 defines offenses relating to being bribed.85
80. Functionalism seeks to attain peace by pieces. Namely, specialist agencies defined around particular
problems seek to develop and apply expert knowledge to apply to isolated individual disputes. See, e.g., ERic
ENGLE, LEx NATURALis, lus NATURALIS: LAW AS PosITivE REASONING & NA-ruRAL. RATIONALITY, 36-
38, 154-155 (2010).
81. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business, at 1-2, [C(2009)64] (May 25, 2009) (non-binding norm; merely
recommending state parties to take up binding national legislation).
82. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 43, § I (U.K.).
83. Id.
84. Bribery Act § 2.
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Thus, taking or offering a bribe is covered under the general offense which reaches com-
mercial bribery, sometimes referred to as private to private bribery. Comparatively speak-
ing, commercial bribery is recognized in some form in most U.S. states, though it is
generally not addressed in the international conventions or, so far as I understand, in the
FCPA. The United Kingdom seeks to raise the international standard on that point.
"However, unlike bribery involving public officials, the logic of criminalizing bribery be-
tween commercial entities is sometimes questioned."86
The two "general offenses"-taking or receiving a bribe-reach commercial i.e. private
actors. Do they also reach bribery of officials? The general offenses do not appear to
explicitly include or exclude bribery of public officials. Structurally, having defined gen-
eral offenses which clearly include at least commercial bribery, the statute then defines
"specific offenses," starting with the specific offense of "bribery of foreign public offi-
cials." 87 That creates the argument that the structure of the legislation excludes bribery of
public officials from the general offenses, which is an odd result, because the OECD Con-
vention that the statute effectively implements is aimed only at bribery of public officials.
The second, and perhaps most controversial specific offense, is also the last offense
defined in the Act: "failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery."88 There,
strict liability may be imputed to the corporation for the wrongful act of an associated
person. The obvious question is who is an "associated person"? Directors? Officers?
Employees? Likely all three. What about shareholders? Spouses? Children? Subsidiar-
ies? Subcontractors? The statute on its own terms doesn't answer who is an "associated
person." Happily, we can well imagine the eventual judge drawing on principles of tort
liability (respondeat superior, vicarious liability, imputed liability), contract (privity), capi-
tal markets law (corporate insiders), and corporate criminal law to determine with some
predictability who is or is not an "associated person." I expect "associated person" will be
defined as employers, directors, shareholders, persons in privity to those groups, general
partners, probably also silent partners, wholly owned subsidiaries, probably also majority
owned subsidiaries, joint venture partners, but probably not subcontractors; frankly I have
no idea if shareholders or silent partners should be treated as associated persons or, if so,
when. The court may well be forced to develop a center of gravity approach of some kind
under which sometimes a shareholder will be an "associated person" and at other times
will not. Regardless of what the court does in fact do with this undefined term, judicial
interpretation can credibly cure this flaw because of the array of flanking corporate laws
from which to draw analogies. However, one can imagine this Act leading to the use of
subcontractors, and subsidiaries to outsource graft, as similar outcomes resulted from the
Alien Torts Statute.89
As noted, the Act does not exempt facilitation payments. But, bribes paid by the military
or intelligence services are exempted.90 There the difficult issue is the use of "Her Maj-
esty's Service" to obtain not vital intelligence about impending attacks but market share
85. Id.
86. McInerney, supra note 13, at 104.
87. Bribery Act § 6.
88. § 7.
89. See Eric Engle, U.S. Corporate Liability for Torts of Foreign Subsidiaries, 23 CoRP. CoUNSEL REv. 90
(2004). See also Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim's Protection Act: Jurisdictional Founda-
tions and Procedural Obstacle, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 1, 8 (2006).
90. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 43, § 13.
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for sale of British Aerospace products9I -industrial espionage masquerading as security.
The problem of corruption in military contracting is a matter for domestic British law to
sort through. Here, however, the equitable remedy of procurement bars is called to the
reader's attention.
With crafty interpretation, the judiciary might somehow reach a judicial (not equitable:
equity does not exonerate otherwise wrongful acts-"he who seeks equity must do eq-
uity") solutions. Perhaps the judiciary will find an exemption for facilitation payments, or
an exemption for de minimis payments? Whether and how the court reaches such exemp-
tions cannot be predicted either from the statute or other laws with which this author is
familiar. A good argument might be to compare the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act to other simi-
lar laws overseas which do exempt "grease" payments as persuasive evidence that the Brit-
ish legislator did not intend to capture such conduct because it did not specifically say it
would do so and because capturing such conduct might lead to conflicts of jurisdiction or
between British law and the U.K.'s international obligation. 92
What is clear is that the Act covers commercial bribery. Commercial bribery is one (the
only?) basis for the general claims.93 Criminalizing commercial bribery is controversial
because commercial bribery is not defined internationally, so far as I have seen, though it
can be found in the laws of some of the federated states of the United States. It is also
clear that commercial organizations are (strictly!) liable for failure to prevent bribery by
(not of) persons associated with it (was that the result of bad drafting?). Commercial
bribery is not well defined in the statute. I would argue that the essence of commercial
bribery is an economically induced breach offiduciary duty. Those are my own terms. Perhaps
penetrating legal research would find a better rationale? I do think the terms I suggest
reach the gravamen of the wrong. On its own terms, the Anti-Bribery Act centers the
wrong on obtaining or retaining commercial advantage94 and/or business.95 Just about all
company actions aim at commercial advantage and/or obtaining and/or retaining market
share. Thus, business advantage is not the best focal point for capturing the wrongful act
because that test captures almost all conduct of a commercial enterprise. Commercial
organizations may assert the affirmative defense to an accusation of failing to prevent
bribery by (not of) persons associated with the organization that the commercial organiza-
tion had "adequate procedures" in place to prevent the wrongful act of the associated
person.96 The Act does not define "adequate procedures." But, here at least, the judge
can look at the vast literature and even case law on corporate governance. So for example,
we can readily envision a corporate code of conduct, corporate trainings, and contractual
provisions in the company's business practices. In fact, the soft-law aspects of the Act are
the most interesting and innovative aspect of the Act. The Act is doing some very inter-
esting things. It is essentially imposing a policing function on corporations-after all,
they are the ones acting, the ones closest to the transactions. The Act is also relying on
soft law measures to form hard law.97 Consequently, most law and consulting firms are
91. David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE Accused of Secretly Paying lbn to Saudi Prince, GUARDIAN, June 7,2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/07/bael.
92. Then again, maybe not; your guess is as good as mine, maybe better.
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advising their clients to undertake compliance measures such as audits and trainings.98
Similar "due diligence" actions such as Corporate Codes of Good Conduct (COGCs) and
management trainungs were (and are) also recommended with respect to the U.S. FCPA,"
even though the FCPA does not provide for liability on a theory of commercial bribery or
strict liability.
IV. Critique of the British Law
A. Acrus REUS
1. Ertortion versus Bribery
As noted, the Act is vague: as written, the Act potentially covers so much conduct that
extortion could well be included into the general offenses. Thus, it would be sensible for
the judiciary to interpret the statute to exclude conduct which would be characterized as
extortion. Bribery may be distinguished from extortion in that extortion relies on du-
ress. 00 This illustrates that some of the ambiguity in the Act can be cured by interpreting
the Act in light of flanking criminal legislation so as to delimit the exact extent of the Act.
2. Commercial Bribery
The FCPA and the international conventions surveyed do not criminalize commercial
bribery. Criminalization of commercial bribery does not conflict with the terms of the
conventions but is not mandated by them. Trying to draw on the international instru-
ments described here will not help the British judge define commercial bribery, nor will
looking to the FCPA. Nor is commercial bribery coherently defined in the Act. I suggest
centering the definition of commercial bribery on the idea of some breach offiduciary duty
and/or a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. However, while the applicability of
commercial bribery can be rendered coherent in this way, it cannot be interpreted away by
any judge, no matter how interventionist or activist she may be. The challenge for human
rights and rule of law advocates is to figure out how best to generate business practices
which will ultimately define just what is and isn't commercial bribery. To that extent, one
can hope that NGOs will promulgate model codes of business conduct.
B. MENs REA
The U.K. statute applies "strict liability" to companies.o'0 It would be prudent to inter-
pret the statute as applying by implication there from specific intent to natural persons;
that distinction is justified because natural persons are capable of being imprisoned and
should enjoy the higher standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) of criminal defend-
ants. This would be the interpretation moreover that one should expect from the court at
98. See, e.g., Gary DiBianco & Perry Madden, UK Parliament Enacts Landmark Anti-Bribery Law, SKAD-
DEN, Apr. 1, 2010, http-J/www.skadden.com/Index.cfin?contentlD=51&itemlD=2045.
99. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human
Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMuTE L. REv. 103 (2004).
100. McInerney, supra note 13, at 99.
101. See id.
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least as to criminal prosecutions-in contrast to civil prosecutions, which would likely be
based on an ordinary standard of proof (likelier than not).
C. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
1. Procurement and Licensing Restrictions
The problem with the British Act is that it overreaches, taking into account "commer-
cial" bribery and strict liability for corporations (extraterritoriality is not so problematic
but elicits howls, too). Further, the Act's substantive offenses and defenses are poorly
defined. Judicial interpretation can, should, and likely will clarify the exact contours of the
legislation. But, the Act does not address two remedies which would be very effective:
procurement bars and license revocation. A procurement bar is the refusal of a State to
enter into business contracts with a corporation that has violated the law. 102 A licensing
restriction is the suspension or revocation of a license, e.g. to practice law or medicine,
resulting from the wrongful conduct of the license holder. Courts could and should inter-
pret the statutes in question where possible to find such remedies, for they would be
effective.103
2. A Private Cause of Action
The U.K. Act does not, and should not, create a private law cause of action unless and
until it modifies its substantive definitions of the covered actions and actors to create
adequate legal certainty to avoid a flood of self-interested litigation.
3. Disgorgement (forfeiture)
Because the United Kingdom is a common law country equitable remedies are also
generally available. So, in theory, a British court could order disgorgement of wrongful
profit. However, the remedy of disgorgement is problematic because measuring the prof-
its resulting from a bribe will at times be difficult or impossible, which is one reason to be
hesitant to use disgorgement as a remedy to cases of international bribery. 04 Further-
more, permitting extraterritorial forfeiture could lead to overly zealous enforcement by
prosecutors seeking to increase their budgets as well as to jurisdictional conflict.105
102. "In many states, corporations that engage in bribery of public officials may be barred from receiving
further government contracts for up to a three year period. Such statutes typically specify that subject to
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, bidders, offerors, or contractors including, in some cases,
natural persons such as partners, members, officers, directors, or responsible managing officers of such enti-
ties, can be excluded from public contracts based on inter alia a criminal conviction in relation to obtaining a
public or private contract or a conviction of bribery under state or federal law. Constitutional challenges to
such statutes have generally failed." Id. at 103-04.
103. "As with bars from procurement, many states make bribery convictions grounds upon which licenses
may be withheld. The types of licenses to which such prohibitions apply range from licensed professional
counselors to dentistry. Unlike the procurement bars discussed previously, the licensing restrictions can be
far more onerous as they usually are irrefutable and presumably last a lifetime." Id. at 104.
104. Weiss, supra note 4, at 502-03.
105. "[W]hile foreign enforcement is in its relative infancy, the recent growth in the number of these actions
is a trend that will continue and that may eventually create a risk of redundant enforcement." Id. at 481.
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D. REFORMING TIE BRITISH STATUTE THROUGH GREATER CONCETIUAL AND
TERMINOLOGICAL CLARITY
It is unproblematic that the British general offense reaches both the bribed and the
briber. But, it is somewhat problematic that the British Act reaches commercial bribery
because the British statute defines the offenses too vaguely. A more exacting and doctri-
nally coherent analysis would look at corruption as a variety of offenses: patronage/nepo-
tism; bribery; misappropriation of funds (embezzlement); breach of fiduciary duty;
unlawful and immoral conduct (e.g. illegal drugs, prostitution); betrayal of public trust;
and political corruption. 0 6 Carr's groundbreaking work in defining corruption with spec-
ificity has not been completed, but legal scholars can and should try to organize thinking
about corruption around the above mentioned concepts, and then seek to impose coher-
ence onto the vague British Anti-Bribery Act thereby. Faced with an ambiguous statute
but clear scholarship, judges could complete the meaning of the statute by referring to
scholars' works as persuasive evidence of the (internationally applicable) law.
V. Overall Conclusions
Although the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act is poorly crafted, it does raise international stan-
dards because it effectively forces corporations to institute effective procedures to prevent
bribery, such as corporate codes of conduct, internal trainings, contractual provisions, and
"triple bottom line" auditing. The Act also raises the international standard by including
facilitation payments and commercial bribery. But, because the statute casts its net so
broadly, its attempt to raise the standard internationally may miss the mark. The extrater-
ritorial character of the Act is not problematic. The vaguely defined predicate acts may be
problematic but can be interpreted by courts so as to create adequate legal certainty for
business, especially given the defense such of effective procedures. Doubtless, the Act will
be amended, just as the U.S. FCPA was; perhaps facilitation payments will be exempted,
or even commercial bribery. But, for now at least, companies are under the strongest
pressure to institute procedures and standards so as to have the defense of adequate proce-
dures in the event one of their employees breaks the law and should recast any requested
facilitation payment contractually. This paper has tried to propose some interpretations
of the Act which would reduce the uncertainties of the as-yet uninterpreted and unen-
forced law. Hopefully thereby it contributes to creating transparency and the rule of law
in international commerce.
106. See Indira M. Carr, Fighting Comption Through Regional and International Corruption: A Satisfactory
Solution?, 15 EUR. J. CRIME, CIUM. L. Clum. Jus-r. 121 (2007).
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